

A study on Hybrid Threats



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Democracy: A fading cultural exponent of the West?

The purpose of this text is to discuss two contemporary challenges versus Western Democracy, commonly simply called Democracy. These challenges emanates from very different directions but has met each other in their direct and indirect efforts to quench and bypass democracy. The challenges are change of rationality by immigration to the West and NGOs fighting a fight versus democracy. Both of these threats have been used in what can be called hybrid warfare, by a host of different state actors.¹ This will be described in the following. Further, after it has been established that authoritarian regimes are using these tools to destabilise European democracies the threats will be discussed as used by non-state actors, still with the destabilising effect of democracy. This paper argues that there is an attack on the European Union in the guise of migration and supported by authoritarian states. These attacks come in different shapes, as making us act as weak but also targeting our weaknesses more directly as with weaponizing migration. This paper reflects on certain aspects of the contemporary discussion on *hybrid threats* with some source material from the views of seasoned NATO officers.² Military officers operate on a social field which differs from the political social field in rationality. There is no denying of threats when it comes to the military, at least as long as they are not at the upper strata where they come to be affected by the logic of the political field. The term itself will

¹ H. Gunneriusson and S. Bachmann, "Western Denial and Russian Control. How Russia's National Security Strategy Threatens a Western-Based Approach to Global Security, the Rule of Law and Globalization", *Polish Political Science Yearbook*, 46(1), 2017

² The material about officer's opinions is taken from a Survey (89,5% answer frequency), done by his paper's author, on Hybrid Warfare done on 38 (outcome) NATO officer's studying at NDC (NATO Defense College) Autumn 2018. They were Lieutenant Colonels, Colonels and a handful of Majors.

inspire new perspectives with a heuristic explorative approach meaning it is defined by the empirical logic of practice.

Nothing shall here be more strongly emphasized: knowledge of the cultural significance of concrete historical contexts is the one and only objective even for concept forming and concept critical research.³

Hybrid warfare

The above Max Weber quote emphasizes something which is easy to forget: namely that all historical events are context based and that it is very difficult to generalize based on ideas regarding culture, social theory or prejudices for that matter. There is always an event, actor or social structure to ruin the beautiful pattern which the researcher or professional pundit is trying to achieve. Generalizations which are likely to be falsified in one way or another should anyhow be made based on empirical fact. However, as reality is so complex, one must allow empiricism to contradict theory as long as it can be said that the theory is valid based on a representative empirical foundation. This differs from the type of strict positivism applicable in natural science, where the material really is not as complex and contradictory as that of the human and social sciences. Any number of perspectives can be applied to phenomena related to war and culture, the *rationality perspective* is one of them. Previous research on modern wars has mentioned the discrepancy against western rationality as an important factor in explaining why actors from other cultures could not be forced to accept defeat.⁴

³ Weber, 1991b. p. 162. Author's translation.

⁴ See for example Hills. 2004. p. 37.


Migration and hybrid warfare

Why does migration matter regarding hybrid warfare and how can it be used as a tool versus democracies? First off it is not migration in general which the problem is. The problem is of social and economic nature. Western democracies have developed into well-fare states with a form of government in which the state protects and promotes the economic and social well-being of the citizens, based upon the principles of equal opportunity, equitable distribution of wealth, and public responsibility for citizens unable to avail themselves of the minimal provisions for a good life.⁵ Migration by people who neither can carry their economic cost, not adapts to society will most likely create frictions of a range of different natures in society.

Hybrid warfare is also very much about affecting the societies we live in – not only the perception of our societies. European politicians should be both aware of this and also be willing to address the problems as the warfare is played out at their level of responsibility, as the political level is on the political-strategical level. This reasoning leads us to pinpoint the effects of hybrid warfare as having great importance on the strategically level as hybrid warfare is about attacking the credibility of societies as described above. In fact the attacks go even further. That notion is reinforced by the opinions which military NATO officers have of the concept, as seen in the chart below.

⁵ <https://www.britannica.com/topic/welfare-state>

Importance of Hybrid Warfare on the Strategic Political Level



According to the survey conducted for this article, NATO officers find the hybrid scenario most relevant on the strategic-political level and ever less important down the command structure.⁶ So what problems does the European Union face when it comes to its internal socio-cultural cohesion? One issue is the mass-immigration to the European Union and the consequences this brings. The consequences can be divided into economic and cultural consequences. The economic consequences are that the migrants in a large scale do fair well when it comes to obtaining a job. They are thus dependent of the state, to a varying degree depending on which European state they have chosen to acquire benefits from. This is stressful for the welfare state

⁶ Håkan Gunneriusson "Hybrid Warfare and Deniability as Understood by the Military", *Polish Political Science Yearbook 2019 Volume 48, Issue 2*. Torun, 2019.



as more people are supposed to share the same amount of cake, something got to give.⁷ The citizens are seemingly aware of these challenges given the voting behavior of the last decade were parties critical of migration policies (more than critical towards the migrants themselves in many cases) have seen a surge. The political strata of the European Union do also see this problem, even if they not always talk aloud about it. This can be seen in the simple fact that the European Union is not only an area for a free market, but also an area of economic and social closure towards the rest of the world. This is a problem as there are not only migrants and the EU who are the actors in this issue, but also states outside of the EU.

Migrants are used as tools against the European Union by state actors outside of the EU. For example, Italy paid Muammar Gaddafi \$500 million worth back in 2008. This was the cost of the dictator to keep down the level of refugees transiting through Libya, even if Gaddafi used an argument for payback because of Italian colonial past as legitimating argument. The Italian prime minister was more direct in RAI, the Italian state television: there should be "fewer clandestine migrants leaving Libyan shores for Italian" coastlines.⁸ This was a decade ago, but the problem is still very much of a severe nature for the EU.

⁷ For the Swedish example, see Tino Sanandaji *Massutmaning*, 2016. Stockholm. pp. 39.

⁸ <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/31/world/europe/31iht-italy.4.15774385.html>

The Turkish regime has weaponized the Syrian conflict versus the European Union in no uncertain terms. Or with Erdoğan's own words: "I am proud of what I said. We have defended the rights of Turkey and the refugees. And we told them [the Europeans]: 'Sorry, we will open the doors and say goodbye to the migrants' [...] We can open the doors to Greece and Bulgaria anytime and put the refugees on buses".⁹ In this context the European Union pays Turkey for retaining and taking back migrants for multibillion concessions monetary concessions and other political concessions as well.¹⁰ The European Union frame it as a humanitarian program, but it is not more of a program than handing Turkey the money which Turkey demands to keep the border towards the EU tight.¹¹ So with this logic of practice from the EU it is clear that there is an awareness of the dangers of unlimited migration, even if the politicians seldom recognize this threat in public. Erdoğan also combines this type of hybrid attack with a logic of practice which China is following in the South Chinese Sea. That is flouting international law in the maritime arena.¹²

The problem is at the political level, where the will to resist hybrid warfare practices is weak (see chapter below on Rationality). There is in all these cases also a certain unwillingness to recognize

⁹ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/12/turkish-president-threatens-to-send-millions-of-syrian-refugees-to-eu>

¹⁰ <https://www.dw.com/en/eu-turkey-migrant-deal-done/a-19127595>

¹¹ http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-1_en.htm

<https://www.yenisafak.com/en/news/turkeys-vice-president-meets-eu-humanitarian-official-3471112>

¹² For Turkey vs Cyprus: <http://www.cna.org.cy/WebNews-en.aspx?a=303df3fad77e42818f97e84193a79ab5>
For China: Sascha Dominik Bachmann, Andrew Dowse, Håkan Gunneriusson, "Competition short of war - how Russia's hybrid and grey-zone warfare are a blueprint for China's global power ambitions", *Australian Journal of Defence and Strategic Studies*, 2019.




the problems as they are for a large part of the European strata of politicians, no matter if it is about Russian regular warfare in Ukraine or about the eroding socio-cultural cohesion of the European nation states due to for example migration. This is also the effect which comes from the Russian reflexive control, were the citizens of the EU also experience that the EU do not stand up against Russian aggression, which erodes the confidence in our institutions.

Because we in the West do not want to threaten the global economic system by going against states that violate international law, we stand to pay a price of decreased trust in the EU. That is more than a collateral effect; it is the hybrid damage of actions taken by states which do not necessarily wants us the best. With this trend continuing, we might observe a burgeoning challenge to the Westphalian system expanding. “The future is already here, it is just not very evenly distributed” as the science fiction author William Gibson put it.¹³

¹³ W. Gibson, "The Science in Science Fiction", *Talk of the Nation*, NPR, November 30, 1999.

Is it important in a Hybrid Warfare context to erode the socio-cultural cohesion of the adversary's population as you understand it?



So how would attacks on our societies play out then? Is it primarily about kinetically attacks, with armed forces, or is it about other actions? It can of course be attacks with regular forces combined with other methods. But we attacks on us can also be about changing the perception of the West in the eyes of the bystanders. These bystanders can be authoritative countries, or countries with weak democratic systems which might side with major actors (e.g. Russia and China) who oppose the values of the Western democracies. The direct attacks on our societies are about eroding the socio-cultural cohesion among the citizens. This together with the fact that hybrid warfare is a factor on the highest level of warfare, the strategically one fits well with migration as one tool for this warfare. Turkey is provoking the EU in a range of ways. Illegal drilling at sea on Cypriote water is another confrontation along with the migrant threat which Turkey

rises. If Turkey's illegal activities continue, the EU will respond, as described in the Council Conclusions, Commission and EEAS spokesman Peter Stano stressed the 16th of April 2020:¹⁴

the EU's position is clear, unchanging and We have reiterated many times that we express our concern and the strong condemnation of the continuing Turkish activity associated with illegal drilling in the eastern Mediterranean, we stand strong together with Cyprus expressing our solidarity with Cyprus in relation to the respect of the sovereignty and sovereign rights in accordance with international law.

It is clear that the threats are perceived as threats by the EU. The response is not at pair with this though. The use of soft power tends to has slide into a practice of statements rather than action. This will be further explained in the chapter "Rationality and culture" below.

Hybrid warfare and non-state actors

In the following some examples will be presented on the use of NGOs/GONGOs in order to create deniability and instability. NGOs are a well-known entity. It deals with Non Governmental Organizations. An organization being non-governmental hints in the direction that they are autonomous from states and often driven by idealistic goals. Less highlighted is that these organizations are outside of the democratic process, the heart of the decision-process in democracies. NGOs have by their autonomous status a useful perk for governments. These

¹⁴ <http://www.cna.org.cy/WebNews-en.aspx?a=303df3fad77e42818f97e84193a79ab5>

organizations can act as the extended arm of states where the states wants to implement policy, either outside of the geographical domain of the state (e.g. a war zone in a foreign country) or in immaterial domains where the state might be cautious to act (e.g. promoting ideas by proxy). The UN is a good example of the latter, with a host of branches which deals with a lot more than just relief work. As NGOs are so useful for states there have emerged Governmental NGOs (GONGOs). They are set up or sponsored by a government in order to further its political interests and mimic the civic groups and civil society at home, or promote its international or geopolitical interests abroad. The organization do not need to be created by a state to be a GONGO, sponsorship is enough. This has by different state's official development assistance made many NGOs borderline GONGOs or beyond borderline.

We will look at typical GONGOs and see how they can be used by a state. The Russian Orthodox Church can in many respects be seen as a GONGO, a Governmental NGO (Non-Government organization). The church supports Putin and there are reasons to not really see it as autonomous from the Russian state or the interest of Putin.¹⁵ Why is it that non-governmental organizations are useful for states? Well any help is important from a political point of view, but that does not explain why non-governmental, governmental organizations could do the same? That is true, but it looks a bit more legitimate if non-governmental organizations make the work. That is even true for warfare today, an affair which we like to imagine is a state affair, if not being an insurgency

¹⁵ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YfdxA9z0STI>
<https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-gets-a-church-of-its-ownand-vladimir-putin-glows-11566576051>

or similar. We will look at this a bit closer, to show that GONGOs in the shape of NGOs are important in shaping politics.

In order to enable Russian deniability and the hybrid aspect of their warfare on the political-strategical level, there are certain characteristics of the warfare in Ukraine rather than tactical level activity being hybrid itself. Here I am mainly referring to the lack of projected airpower. Since the initial outbreak of fighting, there has been no projection of Russian air power, or Ukrainian for that matter (Interfax-Ukraine, 2014). It is not an issue of Ukrainian anti-air or other air denial systems, as Russia is capable of delivering kinetic payload from the deep interior of Russia and to the middle Ukraine. Rather the absence of Russian airpower is for deniability. Russia has a proxy army in Ukraine, which is what enables the hybrid scenario.¹⁶ The aforementioned use of a Russian Proxy Army is important as it gives Russia the possibility to be both somewhere and nowhere at the same time. This works as long as the West allows Russia to act this way, which Russia counts on. The trend with states using Private Military and Security Companies (PMSC) is another aspect of deniability; examples of this are notably Blackwater/Academia for the USA and the Wagner Group for Russia. The term GONGO (Government Nongovernment Organizations) has recently surfaced as an indicating the prominence of this trend (Estonian Security Police, 2014). These troops do bring a certain degree of deniability for state actors (Spearin, 2018). The use of Russian PMSCs in Syria for example is well known.¹⁷ Russian President

¹⁶ On proxy war and Ukraine, see Veljovski, 2017.

¹⁷ These are only a small portion of the actual Russian military personnel that has circulated through

Vladimir Putin himself has been very clear on the utility of Russian PMSCs; they “are a way of implementing national interests without the direct involvement of the state”.¹⁸ It has to be stressed that any unit can be made to look as a PMSC with a minimum of effort. The deniability of the Russian PMSCs is a legal issue but is more importantly an issue with the deniability they provide for Russia. The West is unwilling to take an action in force against Russia due to risk of escalation. Russia offers the West the opportunity to not escalate politically in a situation where Russia is acting, with the Russian use of PMSC. There is enough empirical material to expose Russia and act if there is a willingness to do so. This feeds the Russian PMSC directly into the narrative of offering deniability. NATO could – at least in theory – just state any time that they view these contractors as Russian troops, on Russia’s payroll, thus calling a spade a spade. The utility of such an attitude is of course limited as it could have suboptimal consequences. For example, the US could be forced to say that Russian and US troops have been in an engagement in which the US deliberately killed over a hundred Russian troops in Syria (Borger & Bennetts, 2018; Yaffa, 2018). There is no interest whatsoever from either the US or Russia to acknowledge such an event as a state vs state action, no matter how clearly it has happened. The problem, and utility, with Russian PMSC, is more about our chosen perception of them and not about the legal status of the same PMSC. If we chose to see them as non-Russian, then we avoid a direct confrontation with Russia, which is good. But it also gives Russia a free pass to act while not taking

Syria. An estimate is that 48 0000 Russians soldiers in total have been deployed to Syria at some point. It is also seen as an essential career move for Russian officer’s to have Syria in their CV, e.g. the current Commander of the Western Military district general Kartapolov (Barrie & Gethin, 2018).

¹⁸ Vladimir Putin cited in Sputnik International, “Russia May Consider Establishing Private Military Companies”, 13 April 2012; quoted in (Spearin, 2018, p. 68). The topic of Spearin’s article quoted in this article is mostly about interesting legal issues with PMSC

responsibility for its actions. To maintain the veil of deniability the Russian usage of PMSCs will leave them with little possibility of indirect or direct support. One cannot both state that troops are not under national command and still provide them with indirect support, which undoubtedly is under national command. The lack of air power in Ukraine, a consequence of continued deniability, as in Syria with the Wagner troops follows the same pattern. In an episode 2018 – when Wagner troops faced the US’s howitzers, jets and attack helicopters – in North Eastern Syria, there was no help available for the Wagner troops. Not because Russia lacked the resources – in fact Russia had ample air power in the region and Kalibr cruise missiles had previously been used in Syria – but because of the desire to maintain deniability.¹⁹

Summary: Hybrid warfare and non-state actors

In the previous chapter we have seen that migration can be used by states, as Turkey, to put pressure on democratic states. Further we have seen that this agenda can be categorized as a form of hybrid warfare on western democracies. We have also seen that states, as Russia, use apparently independent organizations to achieve political goals and gains. These organizations can at times be labeled Governmental Non-Governmental Organizations (GONGO).

¹⁹ For example did the frigate Admiral Essen and submarine Krasnodar did fire four “Kalibr” missiles against targets based to the east of Palmyra, according to the Russian Ministry of Defence. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/31/russian-warships-fire-cruise-missiles-isil-targets-near-palmyra/> <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-40104728>.

Migration GONGOs & NGOs: the example of Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders (MSF)

Mass migration is destabilizing the European Union. An example is Germany and the huge influx of Syrian, etc refugees (genuine refugees and economic migrants coming both from Syria or utilizing the situation in Syria, coming from other countries) has caused a divide within the EU. Europe is facing an increased insecurity due to imported terrorist movements, often of a decentralized character without a central leadership. Directly the terrorists pose an immediate threat for civilians in our society, indirectly a large number of migrants' results in failed assimilation or integration. As the influx of people is of major scale and at a fast rate with little control - mainly due to failed integration which will be dealt with in chapter below but also because of lax control at the EUs border - the cultural change can without exaggeration be described as nothing less than revolutionary as it happens fast and with little or no control. Hybrid threats pose not only security challenges but also legal ones and only time will tell how Western societies will eventually adapt within their existing legal and operational frameworks.

The European Union is a free trade area for goods, capital, services, and labour – the so called “four freedoms”. The other side of this is that the EU has external borders. The countries beyond the border do not have these four freedoms granted, as this is the very core benefit of the EU. Frontex is the EUs tool for keeping the borders during peace. It promotes, coordinates and develops European border management in line with the EU fundamental rights charter and the concept of



Integrated Border Management. Frontex focuses on preventing smuggling, human trafficking and terrorism as well as many other cross-border crimes.²⁰

This is all part of the democratic processes defining western democracy. Democracies can make tough decisions, they can decide to wage war and defend themselves in all kind of ways along the DIMEFIL spectrum.²¹ In this case the EUJ has decided that the trade union is a reality only if there is a border which excludes others to be a part of the inner market.

So are democratic institutions respected? We have seen that autocratic states have a natural disposition to promote their style of government at the cost of democracies, this through actions described as above. But within our very societies there are organizations opposing democratic decision-making. I am then not primarily talking about parties and groups who have a profound anti-democratic agenda. Their strength might get stronger, it is hard to tell.²² They have one thing going against them and that is that they themselves are pronounced enemies of democracy, which make it harder to operate in a democratic setting. NGOs on the other hand operate according to altruistic ideas which at a glance seem uncontroversial and benevolent. What if they do work against democracy, the very prerequisite for many of these organizations to operate freely?

²⁰ <https://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/origin-tasks/>

²¹ The acronym for Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence and Law Enforcement.

²² The example of the UK shows that Sharia law, which is not decided upon by democratic institutions have made insteps in society. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/08/01/british-court-recognises-sharia-law-landmark-divorce-case/>

We will here take a look at one NGO, *Doctors Without Borders*. Not that it is special in working against policies decided on democratic foundations, not at all. The organization is most renowned for sending volunteer medical personal to places in the world marked with war or unrest. They state themselves that they send “Medical aid where it's needed most—independent, neutral, impartial”.²³ The NGO has come to clash with the EU in recent years, much because of the EUs migration policies, based on the four freedoms, decided upon democratic foundation.

The medical charity has lashed out that it has "sustained attacks on search and rescue by European states". Italian policy is that migrants picked up at sea should be returned to Libya by that country's coastguard. But charities and human rights groups say migrants face appalling conditions in Libya, where abuses at the hands of people-trafficking gangs are rife.²⁴ There were more than a dozen NGO ships in operation in the Mediterranean 2017, but since the EU began training and funding the fledgling Libyan coast guard - which now carries out the vast majority of rescue operation.²⁵


There are of course reasons to act humanitarian at sea. 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea which makes clear that any state with a ship flying its flag should ensure that ship goes to rescue those "in distress." Further The 1974 Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea says any ship learning of persons in distress "should proceed with all speed to their assistance. So of course

²³ <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/who-we-are/principles>

²⁴ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46477158>

²⁵ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44581764>

there are reasons to act. But there are also active choices from an NGO, as MSF. They do not need to act against the EU or the member states of the EU, both resting on democratic foundations – something the MSF is not doing. The organization is based mostly on private donations, something which makes it dependent, even though not directly by states. If states act as private donators or not we do not know in this case. But as we have seen above states do both create NGOs and use NGOs, making them GONGOs of different shades. Anyway, there is nothing which suggests that NGOs by default promote democracy, no matter if they sponsor such projects or not: the legitimacy of democracy comes from the ballot box. What we have is organizations fighting democratic processes.



<http://searchandrescue.msf.org/map.html>

The maps above to the left shows the actions of MSF at the coast of Libya up to 18 February 2020. It claims 453 rescue operations, 229 transfer-operations (“Transfer” “transshipments”) and 81 186 people assisted. The map to the right shows two lines out on the sea marking the contiguous zone of Libya. It allows coastal states to exercise the control necessary to prevent and punish infringements of customs, sanitary, fiscal, and *immigration regulations* within and beyond its territory or territorial sea. 24 nm out, i.e. 44,448 km.²⁶

Even as the comparison between the maps just gives an estimate it is clear that MSF collects people in a maritime area which by law is Libya and transfer these cross border to the EU. MSF has both decided that they should operate in Libyan water and also providing a migration service which the EU does not sanction. If sidestepping democracy should be normal practice, then the field is open for any NGO/GONGO to perform whatever actions they like, with whatever veil of legitimacy they find fitting.

“Transfer” “transshipments” of people from/to other ships (transfers) in order to assure best rescue practices and to efficiently organize the presence of rescue assets in the search and rescue area. This is coordinated by the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) in Rome.” Other NGOs as Human Rights Watch chime in and claim that Libya is not fit to perform rescue

²⁶ <https://www.britannica.com/topic/contiguous-zone>

operations at sea. HRW does not have a democratic mandate either, of course. UNHCR has stated that all countries should “allow civilians fleeing Libya (Libyan nationals, habitual residents of Libya, and third country nationals) access to their territories”.²⁷ These organizations do not have a democratic mandate. Of course the UN gets its legitimacy from states, many who are democracies. That does however not constitute a democratic mandate. The European Union however, and most of its member countries, does not take decisive action to stop NGOs who aid illegal migration. In fact it was MSF who refused to accept European tax money in 2016. They refused when the migration policies of the EU clashed with the NGO. In 2015, funding from EU institutions represented 19 million euros, while funding from Member States represented 37 million euros. MSF also used 6.8 million euros received from the Norwegian Government.²⁸ The Commission implements an estimated 1.7 % of the EU budget and 6.8 % of the European Development Funds (EDFs) through NGOs.²⁹ Many of these NGOs have an agenda which contradicts or even interdicts democratic institutions. The European Court of Human Rights is an example of interdiction. States have accepted to be members at one point and it is unlikely that any ballot would make a change to that. The organizations interfere with not only the sovereignty of the member states, but also more importantly it hampers the democratic processes in these countries. Their status is stronger than for example GRW and MSF as it performs judicial activism at the cost of democracy. In the case of Libya the HRW and Amnesty International has activated The European Court of Human Rights in the case of migrants at sea in Libya.³⁰ So there is a web of NGOs financed by unfaced but truly not democratic forces, against the

²⁷ <https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/eu-shifting-rescue-libya-risks-lives>

²⁸ <https://www.msf.org.uk/article/msf-no-longer-take-funds-eu-member-states-and-institutions>

²⁹ <https://op.europa.eu/webpub/eca/special-reports/ngo-35-2018/en/>

³⁰ <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur30/1392/2019/en/>



democratic institutions of Europe. There is here a conflict between liberalism in the guise of globalization and democracy. It appears in the foreseeable future that Europe is not valuing democracy when in conflict with globalization. This as the EU itself does not seem to take a stance for democracy versus – no matter how benevolent they might seem – NGOs/GONGOs.

What we see increasingly post the cold war is a state of conflict which are more or less continually on-going in the cyber sphere as well as the economic sphere. The division between war and peace might be harder to distinguish as it is. During the cold war we had a global umbrella which constructed some kind of order in the regard of conflicts. These days we have still an on-going conflict but more or less unpredictable. The cause of this unpredictability can be sought outside of the political world order. It gives capacities to non-state actors to act and affect our democratic institutions.

Doctors without borders and other NGOs/GONGOs do interfere with policies decided upon on democratic foundation. There have in the history of democracy always been cabals who believe they know better than the people and that democracy is flawed. This is an ongoing fight for democracy. Should democracies negotiate away their freedom? That is what happening when non democratic institutions try to push policies contradicting the democratic institutions policies. John Stuart Mill stated that you do not have the freedom to sell yourself as a slave, as it goes against freedom. He did not state that any altruistic reasons for slavery should have prevalence. It depends finally on the stance towards J.S. Mill and democracy versus globalist liberalism, what



side one take. For European states and the EU the choice should be clear cut, democracy must have prevalence.


Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.³¹

Rationality and culture

The European Union was built as an economic project, partly to ensure that the tension between Germany and France would not rise to unacceptable levels, i.e. war. With a dynamic development the Trade union became the European Economic Community, still with an economic focus and finally becoming the EU through the path of European Community. At the core European security and European economic prosperity was guidelines at the helm. One could argue that the democratic project – being a parenthesis in history or not – is a Western cultural project. It is today challenged post-cold war, when the idea of capitalism has been successfully merged with totalitarianism on a way not seen since the Second World War. Globalized economy now has been a tool for autocratic states championed by China to suppress and change democracy. There have been such states before but they have not been equally successful. For example has the OPEC-countries had a certain economic leverage on a global economic scale. Their lack of success at affecting democracy in the West towards a totalitarian direction can be explained in a handful of ways. First and foremost, they represent a mono-economy steaming from one natural resource and one only: oil. Their power was thus rather weak at society overall. Further the rationality governing the societies in OPEC-countries differs all too much from the positivistic

³¹ T. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Touchstone, 1962, p.129.

progressive rationality which is the trademark of Western rationality at least since the Enlightenment, but trailing even further back in history. It can be said that ever since the 19th century and in particular in the post-war era, the West has been shaped by a materialistic perspective of rationality. This general perspective also permeates that indicator of our culture called warfare: a fact to bear in mind partly when discussing the history of rationality in the West and the Islamic world during the Middle Ages, but particularly when discussing contemporary radical Islamism. There is simply nothing challenging Western values in these societies, there is no apparent success coming from there, apart from some military flash in the pan occasions at the beginning of this segment of time. The culture emanating from the Islamic world simply has nothing which would yield attraction in the West. The one way for this culture to change Western culture and especially rationality is migration, moving population into the geographic area of the West.





Two ways to look at the world. Western society has more or less abandoned the horizontal monotheistic line of development as an idea. Islamic society cannot by definition abandon this line; it would then no longer be Islamic, but the culture in question could however become secularized.

Today, post-cold war, there is little to no interest in the West to politically go against the rationality of the progressive globalized economy. Today's political social field is governed by the rationality of a liberal globalized economy. It competes with the political rationality that was dominant during the Cold War. The discursive ideological fight during the Cold War was very much alive, along the lines of a political social field ruled by ideological interests. The political rationality of today is mostly focused on having the international economic system working, which an ideologically driven conflict or even attitude might undermine. This weakness of a globalized world is deeper than one can assume at first. It can be fitting to remind that this paper argues that the economic rationality of the globalized world has taken over as the rationality on the political social field (discussed as the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu uses it). That means that political action is difficult to perform, which might counter the dominant economic rationality.

On the other side, however, open immigration can't coexist with a strong social safety net; if you're going to assure health care and a decent income to everyone, you can't make that offer global.³²

Are the democracies right in keeping their autonomy?


So why do democracies have this aversion against uncontrolled migration promoted by a host of NGO (or GONGOs, it is hard to tell). The simple answer is that states, even non-democratic states – have responsibilities towards its citizens. Period. What differ democratic states (or supra states as the EU) from autocratic states is that democracies have legitimacy from the people, the states represent the will of the people by the ballot and not by some diffuse *General Will* in the way for example communists, e.g. Lenin, picked up on the term from Jean Jacque Rousseau in Lenin's concept of *Democratic centralism*. Decisions regarding migration are made based on economic, social cultural and political foundations. In short one can conclude that politicians have responsibility for governing in a responsible way. We will look at the example of Sweden for some of the reasons below, economic, cultural and social problems.

Economic problems in the guise of education

Migration tends to put strain on welfare states if the migrants are not somewhat compared to be citizens in the receiving country. An influx of low-skill immigrants or migrants with

³² <https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/26/the-curious-politics-of-immigration/>

assimilation in society will be at the lower economic strata of society. This will in a democratic society lead to political currents promoting even greater economic transfers by the state in the future.



This is a graph showing problems with getting especially African migrants (15 – 74 years) into the workforce in Sweden. The uppermost staple is Swedish born people outside of the market.³³ This does partly correspond with the low level of education many migrants have.

³³ <https://www.ekonomifakta.se/Fakta/Arbetsmarknad/Integration/arbetsloshet-utrikes-fodda>

Genomsnittligt antal utbildningsår

Hos den vuxna befolkningen, 25 år och äldre, i de fem vanligaste ursprungsländerna för flyktinginvandrare 2019. Utbildningsstatistiken avser år 2018.

| U | Antal utbildningsår U |
|----------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Afghanistan | 3,9 |
| 2. Syrien | 5,1 |
| 3. Somalia | |
| 4. Eritrea | 3,9 |
| 5. Irak | 7,3 |

Källa: UNDP och Migrationsverket


Not: Värdet för Somalia saknas.

<https://www.ekonomifakta.se/Fakta/Arbetsmarknad/Integration/Utbildningsniva/>

In general 28% of the population in Sweden has 15 years of education, which in most cases results in a finished bachelor equivalent.³⁴ It is not easy for a person with Iraqi background to get into the market with half as many years, still having issues to overcome come culture especially language. As countries outside of the OECD (37 countries) does not participate in the PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) it is hard to get exact numbers of the quality

³⁴ <https://www.scb.se/hitta-statistik/sverige-i-siffror/utbildning-jobb-och-pengar/utbildningsnivan-i-sverige/>

of their education. It is easy to assume that they are not at par with the education in North West Europe though. Non-colonial countries as for example Germany, Denmark and Sweden naturally get migrants who have no previous experience with the language of the receiving country.



In these diagrams the negative effect on PISA performance (mentioned above) that migration have on the knowhow on the youth coming to the workforce in Sweden.³⁵ This is well known for many politicians and contributes to their decision process come migration to the EU. At least in

³⁵ <https://www.compareyourcountry.org/pisa/country/SWE?lg=en>

case they factor in progression and continuation of a welfare state at the same level as today. It is fair to say that politicians worrying about these issues are in the right to do so. NGOs on the other side does not have to take any responsibility at all. They just push their agenda, financed by whoever thinks that the result is beneficial: the direct result of migration or even the indirect result of weakened societies. The latter is what eroding the socio-cultural cohesion is about, mentioned in a pie-chart above as important for hybrid warfare.

Social and cultural problems

Social problems coming from migration are mostly problems stemming from lack of assimilation and naturalization of refugees, which is the statement in Article 34 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, commonly called The Refugee Convention.³⁶ If people coming to a country did not deviate in a negative way regarding civic performance then they would not be a problem. Some do of course not deviate in a negative way, some blend in or even outperform citizens in general. But with migration which have educational deficiencies and culturally not fit in you will encounter problems in society with the lack of assimilation and naturalization

³⁶ <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/StatusOfRefugees.aspx>

Kommuner med högst andel personer med utländsk bakgrund, 2019 jämfört med 2018

| Kvinnor | | | | | Män | | | | | Totalt | | | | |
|---------|------|----------------|-------------|--------|------|------|----------------|-------------|--------|--------|------|----------------|-------------|--------|
| Rang | | Kommun | Procent (%) | | Rang | | Kommun | Procent (%) | | Rang | | Kommun | Procent (%) | |
| 2019 | 2018 | | 2019 | 2018 | 2019 | 2018 | | 2019 | 2018 | 2019 | 2018 | | 2019 | 2018 |
| 1 | (1) | Botkyrka | 60,0 | (59,1) | 1 | (1) | Botkyrka | 60,5 | (59,6) | 1 | (1) | Botkyrka | 60,3 | (59,3) |
| 2 | (2) | Haparanda | 56,1 | (56,6) | 2 | (2) | Södertälje | 56,1 | (54,7) | 2 | (2) | Södertälje | 55,6 | (54,3) |
| 3 | (3) | Södertälje | 55,0 | (53,9) | 3 | (4) | Malmö | 47,7 | (47,0) | 3 | (3) | Haparanda | 51,8 | (52,0) |
| 4 | (4) | Malmö | 45,7 | (45,0) | 4 | (3) | Haparanda | 47,6 | (47,7) | 4 | (4) | Malmö | 46,7 | (45,9) |
| 5 | (5) | Sigtuna | 45,5 | (44,1) | 5 | (5) | Sigtuna | 47,0 | (45,6) | 5 | (5) | Sigtuna | 46,2 | (44,9) |
| 6 | (7) | Järfälla | 44,0 | (42,6) | 6 | (6) | Burlöv | 46,8 | (45,5) | 6 | (6) | Burlöv | 45,4 | (44,3) |
| 7 | (6) | Burlöv | 43,9 | (43,1) | 7 | (7) | Järfälla | 44,0 | (42,4) | 7 | (7) | Järfälla | 44,0 | (42,5) |
| 8 | (8) | Sundbyberg | 42,6 | (41,4) | 8 | (8) | Sundbyberg | 43,2 | (42,1) | 8 | (8) | Sundbyberg | 42,9 | (41,8) |
| 9 | (9) | Upplands Väsby | 42,4 | (40,9) | 9 | (10) | Upplands Väsby | 42,5 | (40,7) | 9 | (9) | Upplands Väsby | 42,5 | (40,8) |
| 10 | (10) | Huddinge | 41,0 | (40,3) | 10 | (9) | Huddinge | 41,5 | (41,0) | 10 | (10) | Huddinge | 41,3 | (40,7) |

This chart shows the percentage of people with a foreign background in some of the most migration dense communities in Sweden, for the years 2018 and 2019.³⁷ In order to fight migration kids from middleclass areas gets separated from their class and bussed to segregated areas. It is very doubtful that this is what the parents' wished for when it come to their children.³⁸ This will most likely just increase tension as discontent with the policy and the reasons behind is rife. In Sweden there were a couple of years ago schools with 99% migration background, 10% who just migrated there and one third has been in the country less than 4 years.

³⁷ <https://www.scb.se/hitta-statistik/statistik-efter-amne/befolkning/befolkningens-sammansattning/befolkningsstatistik/pong/tabell-och-diagram/topplistor-kommuner/andel-personer-med-utlandsk-bakgrund/>


³⁸ <https://www.gp.se/nyheter/g%C3%B6teborg/skolchefen-om-f%C3%B6rslaget-kommer-d%C3%A4mpa-segregationen-1.27272219>

The pupils speak 20 languages and have little or no possibility to use the school as a tool for integration, even less assimilation.³⁹ If it has improved in this specific case is not known. But it is a failure and this kind of situations exists in other schools too, even if it is not as extreme. “We called multicultural but in reality we have created a social, economic and humanitarian apartheid”.⁴⁰ When you have people with little experience of society in the range of 40%, then it is increasingly hard to actually contribute a meaningful reception of these migrants and 2nd generation migrants. The problem is not limited to these areas. With a large migration (versus the amount of population the country has) it will transmute community. If the migration is not controlled versus cultural change then the change in culture is uncontrolled. The percentage of the population as a whole in Sweden with a migration background has grown from 14,5% in 1960 to 25,5% in 2019 and 19,6% were born in a foreign country.⁴¹

³⁹ <https://gangvaldet.story.aftonbladet.se/chapter/har-ar-99-procent-av-eleverna-barn-till-invandrare/>

⁴⁰ <https://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/janne-josefsson-det-osar-krutrok-i-varldens-basta-land/>

⁴¹ <https://www.scb.se/hitta-statistik/statistik-efter-amne/befolkning/befolkningens-sammansattning/befolkningsstatistik/pong/tabell-och-diagram/helarsstatistik--riket/befolkningsstatistik-i-sammandrag/>



When it comes to cultural dissimilarities one can see in this graph that there are a mismatch between certain cultures, those far from each other in the chart. As cultures are fluid and a living entity the cultural differences might either change with increased migration - which might in some cases not be beneficial for some countries which are highly functional today; or cultural tension will increase if lack of assimilation continues.⁴² The latter will result in areas which are dysfunctional and have very little with society in general to do (see the migration dense communities' chart above). Ten years ago even Angela Merkel admitted that "This

⁴² <https://www.iffs.se/world-values-survey/>

(multicultural) approach has failed, utterly failed”.⁴³ Swedish No-Go zones -or *exposed areas*, “utsatta områden”, as the political narrative label them, leaving it unclear what they are exposed to - have gone from nonexistent to spreading from the large cities to intermediate ones the recent decade.⁴⁴ The yearbook of the Swedish Secret police of 2018 list 2000 individuals in the country belonging to the islamistic environment, preaching violence as a means to change society. Noteworthy is that they affect society even when they do not perform violent acts.⁴⁵ An example is mosques preaching salafistic ideals, even if cultural change is sprawling.⁴⁶ Some of these actors are being taken into custody⁴⁷. It is hard though to enforce the law on those who apparently not have been breaking any law, even if they apparently work against society. One might down-play the threats on society but the truth lies ahead and reluctance to act early might lead to consequences further ahead. Even if comparisons comparing no-go zones as war zones might be exaggerations it can be used to drive a message home.⁴⁸ Also the situation for individuals being oppressed and even physically manhandled in a suburb might be a lot worse than many people experience in an actual warzone. For example the term *low intensive warfare*, used for guerrilla warfare and COIN-operations, might hold some truth at the operational level, but the situation might be very intense for those at the very front-line when violence is handed out. The phenomenon with strain on society because of uncontrolled migration is a global welfare state problem. In the US immigration violations, mostly by illegal immigrants, has jumped over drugs

⁴³ <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-merkel-immigration-idUSTRE69F1K320101016>

⁴⁴ https://polisen.se/siteassets/dokument/ovriga_rapporter/utsatta-omraden-social-ordning-kriminell-struktur-och-utmaningar-for-polisen-2017.pdf

⁴⁵ <https://www.sakerhetspolisen.se/download/18.6af3d1c916687131f1fae5/1552543607309/Arsbok-2018.pdf>

⁴⁶ <https://www.helahalsingland.se/artikel/omstridd-moske-i-gavle-uppmanade-till-att-rosta-pa-miljopartiet>
Ranstorp M. m.fl. (2018), Mellan Salafism och Salafistisk Jihadism – Påverkan mot och utmaningar för samhället, Centrum för asymmetriska hot- och terrorismstudier, Försvarshögskolan, Stockholm: <http://fhs.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1231645/FULLTEXT02.pdf>

⁴⁷ <https://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=159&artikel=7471012>

⁴⁸ <https://www.svd.se/agrell-vi-maste-agera-for-att-radda-landet> Publicerad 2019-09-13



to become the top federal crime. Federal sentencing for immigration violations surged 22.9% last year, according to the U.S. Sentencing Commission's annual report shared with Secrets.⁴⁹

Summary

We have seen that the international system and democratic values are under assault these days. Many of the attacks come from pseudo-democratic states (e.g. Russia) or outright dictatorships (e.g. China). They often do this in ulterior and indirect ways. The use of deniability, even if it is flimsy, is a common method. The uses of NGOs, GONGOS and MPSC have increased in usage by governments who want to utilize deniability. Many of the attacks on democracy aim at presenting democracy as weak, even illegitimate. This both in the eyes of other nations, who might be on the verge of choosing side between democracy and autocracy, but also in the eye of the population of the democratic countries: weakening the socio-cultural cohesion in democracies. Migration has been one issue which has been weaponized by foreign states. NGOs are reinforcing these attacks by their agenda vs for example the EU and many of its member states, one example being Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders (MSF). As shown there are perfectly legitimate reasons for democracies to establish control over migration, for cultural, economic and social reasons. This has put otherwise established and altruistic NGOs in the spotlight. There is more than one occasion when their agendas work against policy which has been decided upon on democratic foundation. There is no question that democracy must have prevalence in this case. With no democracy it will be very hard for these NGPOs to operate. Further by working against these policies the NGOs are actually doing anti-democratic forces work.

⁴⁹ <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/washington-secrets/immigration-jumps-to-no-1-federal-crime>



In a world where deniability is sought both by private actors and states, often to undermine international law and democratic rule, NGOs should be careful what they ask for when they work against policies made by democratic institutions.